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THE FIRST AMENDMENT GOES TACTICAL:
NEWS MEDIA NEGLIGENCE AND ONGOING
CRIMINAL INCIDENTS
At 4:15 A.M. on December 5, 1987, Escondido Police received a call
reporting shots fired within a local condominium complex.' When
Escondido officers arrived, they found Robert Gary Taschner barricaded in
his condominium and unwilling to talk to police.2 Escondido Police called
for the San Diego County Sheriff's Department's Special Enforcement
Detail ("SED"). 3 SED attempted to storm Taschner's condominium, but
Taschner was lying in wait for the deputies. In the ensuing gun battle,
Taschner killed Deputy Lonnie Brewer and wounded two other deputies.4
SED deputies then withdrew and attempted to negotiate with Taschner.'
SED also called for the assistance of the San Diego Police Department's
Special Weapons and Tactics Team ("SWAT").6 Taschner refused to
surrender after several hours of negotiation and SED decided to use
chemical agents (often called tear gas) to drive Taschner from his
condominium.7 San Diego Police SWAT parked their Victim Rescue
Vehicle ("VRV"), an armored personnel carrier, near the front door of
Taschner's condominium to provide cover for officers deploying the
chemical agents.8 SWAT deployed the chemical agents, and moments later
the condominium caught fire. Taschner ran out of the front door, around
the rear of the VRV and down the driveway toward the street. As
Taschner neared the end of the driveway, he began shooting at deputies on
1. H.G. Reza, Taschner's Saga: From Jail to Gun Store to Shoot-Out, L.A. TIMES (San
Diego County Ed.), Dec. 16, 1987, at B1l.
2. Id
3. Id. The Special Enforcement Detail is a Special Weapons and Tactics Team.
4. Id.
5. Telephone Interview with Lt. Sid Heal, L.A. County Sheriff's Dept., Emergency Operation
Bureau (Sept. 4, 1994).
6. Id
7. Id.
8. Telephone Interview with G.R. Cason, San Diego Police Dept., SWAT (Sept. 3, 1994).
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the perimeter of the scene.9 One SWAT team member leapt out of the
VRV behind Taschner in an attempt to stop him before he killed anyone
else." As thL officer sighted in on Taschner, he realized that a television
camera crew was directly behind Taschner." Fearing that he might hit
the camera crew if he missed Taschner, the officer decided not to shoot.
12
As Taschner reached the end of the driveway, he turned onto the sidewalk
and shot a San Diego Sheriff's Deputy in the hand, forcing him to drop his
gun and leaving him defenseless. 3 Taschner's rifle then malfunctioned,
and he was tackled before he could kill the deputy. 4 In the fight that
ensued on the ground, Sheriff's deputies were forced to shoot Taschner in
the head, resulting in his death.1
5
Incidents such as this have raised serious questions about allowing the
media access to "Ongoing Criminal Incidents"' 6 and whether the media 7
can be held liable when their actions cause the death or injury of a hostage
or responding police officer.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of new technologies such as satellite uplinks and
remote camera crews, television has displaced newspapers and radio as the
predominant news medium. 8 This shift has enabled the media to bring





13. Telephone Interview with Sgt. Don Borinski, San Diego Police Dept., SWAT (Aug. 27,
1994).
14. Id.
15. Id. Following the shooting, the media strongly criticized both SWAT teams for the shot
that was fired at Taschner while he was on the ground fighting with deputies. See, e.g., Barry
M. Horstman, Gunman was 'Executed,' His Mother Claims, L.A. TIMES (San Diego County Ed.),
Dec. 7, 1987, at BI; Eric Bailey and Nancy Ray, Officials Admit Shot Fired Point Blank at
Gunman On Ground Department Says Action by SWAT Deputy at End of Escondido Siege Was
Legitimate, L.A. TIMES (San Diego County Ed.), Dec. 8, 1987, at BI; Anthony Perry, Gunman
was Alive on Ground When Deputy Shot Point Plank, L.A. TIMEs (San Diego County Ed.), Feb.
2, 1988, at B1. This criticism is particularly ironic considering that had the media not been
present, G.R. Cason, the officer who had Taschner in his sights, might have been able to stop him
before the situation reached this point.
16. The term "Ongoing Criminal Incident" will be used in this Comment to describe
barricaded suspects, hostage situations and terrorist incidents.
17. This Comment will use the term "media" to cover all forms of reporting. However,
since television news has the greatest potential to create harm, this Comment will deal primarily
with television media.
18. GEORGE COMSTOCK, TELEVISION IN AMERICA 7 (2d ed. 1991).
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By sending out a remote camera crew, the news media is now able to
report breaking stories live, allowing the public to see first-hand everything
from terrorist attacks to natural disasters. Although in the past police could
provide reporters with interviews and access after the fact, this is no longer
sufficient. The media now aggressively pursues breaking stories and
demands complete access to ongoing situations. Although live coverage
has lead to a well informed public, it has also created serious problems for
law enforcement and in some cases risked the lives of hostages and
responding officers.19
This Comment will argue that when the media's actions lead to the
death or injury of a hostage or police officer, the media should be liable for
damages that result, if those damages were the foreseeable consequence of
their actions.2" Part II of this Comment will explore how newsgathering
and broadcasting during Ongoing Criminal Incidents can endanger the lives
of hostages and police officers. Part I will discuss the historical
requirements for a negligence cause of action and apply those requirements
to the media's activities during Ongoing Criminal Incidents. Part IV will
consider the plausible tort defenses to negligence liability. Part V will
discuss whether the First Amendment will bar the imposition of negligence
liability on the media. Finally, Part VI will propose and discuss a new
standard for media liability that would allow compensation for the victims
of media negligence, while still protecting the First Amendment rights of
the media. Part VI will also discuss how the adoption of such a standard
would eliminate many of the problems associated with the current law on
media negligence.
I. DANGERS OF MEDIA ACCESS TO ONGOING CRIMINAL INCIDENTS
During an Ongoing Criminal Incident, the job of the media is to
disseminate information to the public in the most timely manner possible.
This objective involves two different activities: newsgatherin 2 and
19. See infra part 11.
20. This Comment will only consider potential causes of action against the media by
hostages and police officers who are harmed by the actions of the media. It will not discuss the
possibility of imposing liability for harm that occurs to others, including third party bystanders,
spectators, and other members of the media.
21. As used in this Comment, "newsgathering" means all activities conducted by the media
to obtain information about an Ongoing Criminal Incident. These include, but are not limited to,
interviews with police, official press releases, interviews with hostages and suspects, research into
the background of the hostage taker, and observing police activities.
1995]
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broadcasting.' Conducted responsibly, neither of these activities increases
the danger to hostages and police officers; conducted irresponsibly,
however, both newsgathering and broadcasting activities can significantly
increase the danger involved and can lead to the death or injury of a
hostage or police officer. Unfortunately, the battle for ratings, associated
with television news, acts as a disincentive to responsible reporting.
'"The electronic media in the United States live or die by their ratings,
the number of viewers they attract. As a result, each network wants to be
the first with the most on any big story."'  Although most reporters
maintain high professional standards and endeavor to report responsibly,
"high standards of professionalism do not guide every media organization
nor every reporter."' The intense competition between networks to be
the first to report a particular story sometimes leads reporters to engage in
dangerous newsgathering and broadcasting activities. This section will
explore how these irresponsible newsgathering and broadcasting activities
can lead to the death or injury of a hostage or police officer.
A. Dangers Created by Newsgathering
The media's first job during an Ongoing Criminal Incident is to gather
information about the situation. While there are safe ways for the media
to accomplish this (e.g., attending official press conferences or conducting
post-resolution interviews), unsafe methods often provide information
faster. Occasionally, the media's desire to be the first to report a particular
Ongoing Criminal Incident compels the use of these unsafe methods.
When this occurs, the media can become active participants in the situation,
increasing the danger to both hostages and police officers. Newsgathering
tactics such as arriving at the scene of an incident before police, crossing
police lines to obtain a vantage point, and making direct contact with the
suspect can eliminate the element of surprise for police, prevent police from
protecting themselves, and hinder, or even stalemate, police negotiations
with the suspect.
The element of surprise is important to the peaceful resolution of an
Ongoing Criminal Incident.' When police surprise a suspect, it is
22. As used in this Comment, "broadcasting" means the act of disseminating news gathered
by the media to the public.
23. Katherine Graham, Terrorism and the Media, L.A. DAILY J. - DAILY J. REP., May 2,
1986, at 10, 15.
24. Id. at 16.
25. Telephone Interview with Lt. Sid Heal, L.A. County Sheriff's Dept., Emergency
Operations Bureau (Dec. 23, 1994).
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difficult for the suspect to offer resistance.' This places the suspect in
a "tactical dilemma," a state where "surrender is likely but resistance is
futile."'27 A suspect who is in a tactical dilemma is considerably less
likely to resist and therefore less likely to react violently to police. 8
Consequently, the likelihood of a surprised suspect shooting a police officer
or hostage is greatly reduced.29 Nonetheless, reporters occasionally
receive information about the future actions of law enforcement and, in
preparing to cover the story, arrive at the scene before police. ° This can
alert the suspect to the pending actions of police and provide an oppor-
tunity for the suspect to prepare a defense." When this occurs, the
likelihood that police will be harmed in the process or that a hostage will
be injured in a crossfire increases dramatically.32
One example of this occurred during the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms ("ATF") raid on the Branch Davidian compound near Waco,
Texas (hereinafter "Waco Raid").33 Shortly before the Waco Raid, eleven
reporters "arrived at the scene early and travelled up and down the roads
around the Compound as they prepared to cover the story. One of their
number, KWTX cameraman Peeler, became lost, and, in asking for
directions, unwittingly tipped a cult member that a raid was imminent."'
The cult member took this information and alerted David Koresh, the cult
leader.35 When ATF agents arrived at the compound, they were ambushed
by cult members, resulting in the death of four ATF agents and the injury
26. Lt. Sid Heal, Basic Hostage Rescue Training - Lesson Plans, (Fundamental Tactical
Concepts Sec.) 16 (1993).
27. l at 11.
28. Telephone Interview with Lt. Sid Heal, L.A. County Sheriff's Department, Emergency





33. On February 28, 1993, ATF agents attempted to execute search and arrest warrants at
the Apocalypse Ranch which was owned by the Branch Davidians, a religious cult. Cult
members, led by David Koresh (a.k.a. Vernon Wayne Howell), ambushed agents and a 51 day
standoff began when agents were forced to withdraw. On April 19, 1993, FBI agents began
pumping teargas into the compound. In response to this, Davidian Cult members set fire to the
compound, which burned to the ground, resulting in the death of more than 95 cult members.
Sue Anne Pressley, Waco Siege Ends in Dozens of Deaths As Cult Site Burns After FBI Assault:
Davidians Set Blaze, Officials Say, WASH. PoST, Apr. 20, 1993, at Al.
34. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REP. OF THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO AND
FIREARMS INVESTIGATION OF VERNON WAYNE HowELL ALso KNOWN As DAvID KORESH 161
(1993) [Hereinafter "Waco Report'].
35. Id at 162.
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of at least twenty-eight other ATF agents. 6 While it is difficult to know
what would have occurred if the media had not alerted the cult to the
ATF's actions, there is little question that "the media's conduct posed a
substantial danger not only to the security of ATF's operation but also to
the lives of agents and civilians alike. 37
In addition to eliminating the element of surprise, newsgathering
during Ongoing Criminal Incidents can also physically interfere with police
officers and deprive them of the ability to protect themselves. When a
suspect begins to move between locations, police must have the option of
shooting in any direction the suspect may flee. This is one reason that
police prevent public access to the scene of an incident. Despite police
restriction, members of the media occasionally cross police lines in search
of a vantage point. When this occurs, reporters can unknowingly provide
a "safe zone" into which the suspect can flee, but into which police cannot
shoot without the danger of hitting a reporter. Since the primary concern
of the suspect is survival, the presence of reporters is not likely to prevent
the suspect from shooting in any particular direction. Police officers, on
the other hand, are concerned not only with their own safety, but with the
safety of the reporters as well. Thus, police generally will not shoot in a
direction where there is a danger of injuring a reporter. Consequently, if
suspects position themselves between police and a reporter, they will be
able to shoot at police, but police will not be able to return fire.38 This
increases the likelihood that an officer will be injured or killed by a
suspect. The Taschner incident in Escondido provides an example. 9 The
media set up across the street from the condominium complex, inside the
perimeter drawn for the public. When the suspect began to move, police
had to forego shooting the suspect for fear of hitting a reporter. This
allowed the suspect to reach the end of the driveway and shoot a deputy
sheriff. Another example occurred during the Waco Raid. When the ATF
raid team arrived at the Branch Davidian compound, reporters followed
them onto the property. According to the Waco Report that followed the
incident, "[m]any agents were angry with media personnel who had been
in the midst of the shoot-out, distracting agents while they were under fire
and whom agents had almost shot accidentally, fearing they were cult
36. Id at 102-03.
37. Id. at 163.
38. A collateral issue is that police could also possibly incur civil liability if they did shoot
in an area where reporters were stationed and a reporter was injured. Although a discussion of
this is beyond the scope of this Comment, the concern for civil liability is certainly another factor
which police officers must consider in this type of situation.
39. See supra notes 1-15 and accompanying text.
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members. ' 4" In both cases, the reporters' mere presence complicated the
operation for police and increased the likelihood of a police officer being
injured or killed.
Notwithstanding the increased danger caused by eliminating the
element of surprise and physically interfering in police operations, the most
serious problem created by newsgathering during Ongoing Criminal
Incidents is that the actions of reporters can hinder or even stalemate
negotiations between the suspect and police. This occurs when the media's
desire to "scoop" its competition leads it to contact a suspect or hostage
taker directly by telephone. This can prolong the situation, escalate a
hostage taker's instability, and possibly lead the hostage taker to harm a
hostage in response to a conversation with the media.
When the media talk directly to a suspect, both the phone lines and
the suspect are unavailable to police. Since no negotiations are possible,
the time spent by the suspect with the media simply adds to the duration
of the event. On two separate occasions during the Waco standoff, David
Koresh received emergency breakthroughs 4' from reporters while negoti-
ating with government agents.42 Both times, Koresh disconnected the
negotiator to talk to the reporter.43 This added to the length of the
standoff and the emotional trauma of any unwilling participants in the
compound. Similarly, during the 1977 Hanafi Muslim Siege in Washing-
ton, D.C.,44 numerous reporters called the hostage takers for interviews.45
One of these reporters "rekindled the rage of the terrorist leader, who had
been on the point of surrender."46 The leader did not surrender.
However, an even greater danger posed by direct media contact is that
reporters may agitate the suspect and cause him or her to injure or kill a
hostage. As former District of Columbia Assistant Chief of Police, Robert
L. Rabe noted:
40. Waco Report, supra note 34, at 110.
41. Emergency breakthroughs are an interruption of a telephone conversation by an operator
at the request of another person to tell one of the parties that an emergency call will soon be
coming through.
42. Telephone Interview with Jack Killorin, Executive Assistant for Liason and Public
Information, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (Mar. 15, 1995).
43. Il
44. On March 9, 1977, in Washington, D.C., Hanafi Muslims took over the headquarters of
B'nai B'rith, a Jewish service organization, the city's Islamic Center, and City Hall, taking 134
hostages and killing one. The incident occurred while Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was
meeting with President Jimmy Carter. The terrorists eventually surrendered with no further loss
of life. Graham, supra note 23, at 10.
45. Id. at 12.
46. Id.
1995]
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Reporters must come to realize that they are not trained in the
delicate and sensitive art of hostage negotiation. When you
have inexperienced reporters talking to highly volatile terrorists,
one wrong word, one slip of the tongue, or one question
improperly phrased by a reporter could cause a hostage to lose
his life.47
It is not difficult to conceive of a situation where a member of the media
might ask the wrong question or say the wrong thing and provoke a volatile
suspect to harm a hostage. An example of this occurred during the Hanafi
Muslim siege. A radio reporter identified the terrorists, over the air, as
black Muslims. 4 The terrorist leader, who was a Hanafi rather than black
Muslim, heard the report.49 Following the report, the terrorist leader
announced that if the reporter did not publicly apologize for his statement,
the terrorists would begin cutting off hostages' heads."0 While it is
impossible to know whether the terrorists would have carried out their
threat, this incident is a clear indication of the dangers posed by the
activities of the media. Of course, the dangers created by the media are not
limited to newsgathering - broadcasting activities can also endanger the
lives of hostages and police officers.
B. Dangers Created by Broadcasting
Like responsible newsgathering, responsible broadcasting generally
does not endanger the lives of others. However, because of competition
between networks, Ongoing Criminal Incidents are frequently broadcast
live. These live broadcasts pose a substantial danger to the response efforts
of police and can lead to the injury or death of a police officer or hostage.
Before the use of satellites and remote camera crews, news often took
a day to reach the public.5" This provided news directors with an
opportunity to "filter" the news and decide when and how to report a
story.52 This delay between discovery and dissemination usually eliminat-
ed the problems created by live broadcasts of Ongoing Criminal Incidents.
However, as the time between discovery and dissemination has shortened,
47. Robert L. Rabe, The Journalist and the Hostage: How Their Rights Can Be Balanced,
in TERRORISM, THE MEDIA, AND THE LAW 69, 74 (Abraham H. Miller ed., 1982).
48. Susan Gregory Thomas, All News Anniversary WTOP News Time is ... 25 Years,
WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1994, at C2.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Graham, supra note 23, at 15.
52. Id.
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so too has the time to reflect on what is being reported. The result is that
live news is often beyond the control of the news director and is left to the
discretion of the reporter or the camera operator. This loss of editorial
control can lead to the airing of information that should not be released.
Information such as the movement and locations of a SWAT team,
status of negotiations, locations of escaped hostages and operational plans
are all newsworthy items that allow reporters to attract viewers. However,
until an operation is over, law enforcement has a vested interest in
maintaining the secrecy of these details. Unfortunately, with live
broadcasts, there is no way to prevent the release of dangerous information.
As one commentator noted, "[t]he problem with live is that you give up a
measure of editorial control and therefore you can't always prepare or
anticipate what will happen. You always run the risk of showing
something to the public [or suspect] that may in fact have some negative,
harmful consequence."53  "Indiscriminate live coverage of police oper-
ations on radio and television gives terrorists [or suspects] the latest
information on police activities, a distinct tactical advantage not available
to the police."' This type of information may allow the suspect to
prepare for the actions of police. Moreover, it can also raise the anxiety
of the hostage taker, perhaps making him or her more irrational and
dangerous.55 Although the damage caused by the release of this infor-
mation is unintended, the result is the same: a more violent resolution of
the situation and the risk of death or injury to a hostage or police officer.
For example, in 1990, a gunman took thirty-three customers hostage
in Henry's Publick House and Grille in Berkeley, California.56 As the
SWAT team set up and began negotiations, several press agencies prepared
to cover the story and to relay the gunman's demands to the public.57
"For much of the seven-hour hostage drama, Dashti [the hostage taker] was
glued to the television set. .. . 8 Although the media knew Dashti had
a television, "one reporter had announced on the air that the police SWAT
team was 'set up across the street and that the area was surrounded.'
' 59
53. Chevel Johnson, Suicide on TV Sparks Debate, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Sept. 17, 1994,
at 10 (quoting Roy Peter Clark, senior scholar at the Poynter Institute for Media Studies).
54. Rabe, supra note 47, at 74.
55. Patrick V. Murphy, The Police, The News Media, and the Coverage of Terrorism, in
TERRORISM, THE MEDIA, AND THE LAW 76, 83 (Abraham H. Miller ed., 1982).
56. Dawn Garcia, KPIXApologizes to Berkeley Hostages, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 6, 1990, at A3.
57. An example of Dashti's irrational demands was his demand that the San Francisco Chief
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Even worse, several stations reported that Dashti was "deranged" and that
police described his demands as "irrational and strange."'' 6 According to
one hostage, "[n]ot only was the terrorist aroused by these comments, but
frustrated and angered, believing that his demands, because he was publicly
acknowledged as deranged, were not being taken seriously."61  The
incident ended when Berkeley SWAT members entered the bar and were
forced to shoot Dashti, who later died from his wounds.62
Following the Berkeley incident, public outrage about the media's
conduct prompted one television station to issue an apology for what it
called "a serious error in judgment.' 63 While no police officers, hostages
or bystanders were killed as a result of the media's actions, the Berkeley
incident raises one question: Would a police officer or hostage who is
harmed by the negligent actions of the media have any means of recourse?
The next three sections will explore the possibility of an injured hostage or
police officer recovering against the media for negligence.
6'
I1. MEDIA NEGLIGENCE: A CAUSE OF ACrION?
To establish a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) the defendant had a legal duty to conform to a certain standard of
conduct for the protection of another; (2) the defendant breached that duty;
(3) there is a close causal connection between that failure and the resulting
injury; and (4) actual loss or damages occurred as a result of the defend-
ant's conduct.65 This section will explore the possibility of an injured
police officer or hostage establishing a cause of action for media negli-
gence.6
60. Id.
61. Garcia, supra note 56.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Since the media would likely never intend for their actions to cause harm, the only
plausible civil cause of action would be for negligence. Thus, this will be the only theory of
recovery discussed by this Comment.
65. Nola M. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 16 Cal. App. 4th 421, 426 (1993).
66. A collateral issue to the media's liability is the possibility of a negligence action against
police. If police allow the media to be present, or fail to take actions to remove them when they
become aware of the media's presence, and this leads to the death or injury of a hostage, it is
arguable that police may be liable for the harm that occurs. However, as the exploration of this
area would require a lengthy analysis of the tort doctrine of special relationships, state law "Tort
Claims Acts" and governmental immunities, it is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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A. Duty
A duty is a "standard of conduct imposed by the law... based upon
what society demands generally of its members .... 67 In other words,
a duty is a legal responsibility to act as a reasonably prudent person would
in the same circumstances. 68  Generally, there is no duty to protect other
people from the illegal or tortious acts of a third person.69 However, "[i]f
the likelihood that a third person may react in a particular manner is a
hazard which makes the actor negligent, such reaction... does not prevent
the actor from being liable for the harm caused thereby."7 Thus, where
a third party's actions, or reactions, are the foreseeable consequence of the
actor's conduct, a duty to refrain from that conduct may still be im-
posed.7 '
Whether the court will impose such a duty, however, depends on three
factors: (1) the foreseeability or probability of harm occurring from the
conduct; (2) the gravity of harm that could occur; and (3) the social value
of the actor's conduct.72 Courts generally balance these factors by taking
the probability of harm occurring from the actor's conduct, combined with
the potential gravity of that harm, and weighing it against the social
interests advanced by the conduct.73 When the social value of the actor's
67. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 31, at 169
(5th ed. 1984).
68. Caldwell v. Bechtel, Inc., 631 F.2d 989, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
69. Matthias v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 260 Cal. App. 2d 752, 755 (1968). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
70. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 40 (Cal. 1975).
71. For example, in Weirum, the California Supreme Court found that a radio station owed
a duty to a motorist who died as a result of third party negligence caused by the station's
promotion. 539 P.2d 36, 40 (Cal. 1975). The promotion consisted of a disc jockey ("DJ.")
driving to a particular location in the city and then announcing where he was. The first listener
to reach him and fulfill a particular condition (e.g., answer a question or bring him an item of
clothing) received cash prizes and a brief radio interview. Two listeners, disappointed that they
had missed the DJ. at one location, began to follow him at a high rate of speed to the next
location. In the process of vying for the position closest to the DJ.'s car, they forced a motorist
off the road, resulting in his death. Finding liability against the station, the court reasoned that
"[ilt was foreseeable that defendant's youthful listeners.., would race to arrive first at the next
site and in their haste would disregard the demands of highway safety." Id. at 40. Since it was
foreseeable that this would occur, the court found the radio station had a duty to refrain from the
promotion and that continuing it subjected them to liability. Id.
72. Id. at 40. Although the California Court of Appeal in Musgrove v. Ambrose Properties,
87 Cal. App. 3d 44, 53 (1978), added a fourth element of "ease in preventing harm," this is not
applicable to cases where "[1]iability is not predicated upon [a] defendant's failure to intervene
for the benefit of [another]... "' Weirum, 539 P.2d at 41.
73. Weirum, 539 P.2d at 40.
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conduct is outweighed by the probability and gravity of harm, it is likely
that the conduct will be seen as unreasonable and a duty will be im-
posed.7 4 Conversely, when the harm that occurs is seen as improbable,
the gravity of harm is low, or the probability and gravity of harm are
outweighed by the social value of the conduct, a duty will not be imposed.
Thus, as the gravity of potential harm increases, the probability of harm
required to establish a duty decreases, as does the likelihood that the harm
will be outweighed by the conduct's social value.75 Consequently,
conduct which risks the death of another person is considerably more likely
to establish a duty than conduct that risks only property damage.
Direct interference by the media (e.g., talking to hostage takers or
broadcasting team positions) in an Ongoing Criminal Incident creates a
high degree of foreseeable risk of harm to both police and hostages. 6
Since the media are not trained in the dynamics of these situations or in
tactical planning, the probability of harm resulting from their conduct is
high. Moreover, since the gravity of harm can be serious injury or death,
direct media interference will likely lead to the finding of a duty.' By
contrast, in cases where the media's interference is indirect, such as the
Escondido incident that began this Comment, their conduct will not likely
give rise to a duty. Although the gravity of harm that may occur from
indirect interference is the same as it would occur from direct interference,
it would be difficult for the media to foresee the potential harm that would
result from innocuous conduct, such as being set up across the street from
the incident.
However, even if media conduct is seen as having a high probability
of causing serious harm, it may still be found reasonable if the social
benefits of the conduct outweigh its dangers.7" Although reporting
information to the public about Ongoing Criminal Incidents has tremendous
social value, the overall purpose for the media's conduct is not the issue.
Rather, the social value of an activity is determined by the specific actions
taken. Thus, "[c]onsideration must also be given to any alternative course
74. Id.
75. Since the idea of social value is a utilitarian one which looks at the total value of
conduct to society as a whole, conduct which risks the injury or death of another person is likely
to be seen as having little social value. Thus, no matter what other values a particular conduct
may have, as the gravity of harm increases, it is likely true that the social value decreases.
76. See supra part II.
77. See, e.g., Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579, 587 (Colo. 1984) (finding
that the greater the risk involved in the conduct, the greater the degree of care required).
78. See, e.g., Eckert v. Long Island R.R. Co., 43 N.Y. 523 (1871) (finding that rushing in
front of an oncoming train, to save the life of a child, was reasonable under the circumstances).
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[of action] open to the actor."79 When sufficient alternative means of
accomplishing the same result exist, conduct that has tremendous social
value may be found unreasonable.80 Consequently, to determine an
action's social value, newsgathering tactics themselves, and the timing of
broadcasts, will be considered in light of alternative means of serving the
social interest. In this regard, two factors weigh strongly against the media:
(1) the level of cooperation that exists between the media and law enforce-
ment8 makes information available without the need to engage in
dangerous reporting tactics;82 and (2) that most Ongoing Criminal
Incidents are short in duration makes it possible to wait until the situation
is resolved to report it. 3 When these alternatives are considered, it is
clear that the media does not need to engage in dangerous reporting tactics
to report information about Ongoing Criminal Incidents.' Since risky
reporting tactics are unnecessary, it is likely that such conduct will be
found to be unreasonable and a duty will be imposed.
B. Breach
If the court finds the media actor was under a legal duty to protect the
plaintiff, the plaintiff will next be required to establish that the actor
breached that duty of care." The existence of a breach is not dependent
upon subjective awareness of the risk: "In most instances, [negligence] is
caused by heedlessness or inadvertence, by which the negligent party is
unaware of the results which may follow from his act.816 Whether or not
a breach of duty will be found for media conduct will depend upon the
79. KEfrON s AL., supra note 67, § 31, at 172.
80. Id.
81. An example of this cooperation is the Arcadia, California, Police Department's media
policy which states: "Members of this department shall not abridge the right of the press to the
reasonable and lawful access to information nor shall they interfere with the publication of such
information." ARCADIA POLICE DEPT., MEDIA POLICY, at 2.
82. For example, police press conferences following the incident, interviews with hostages
following the incident, videotaping rather than live broadcasting and even post incident interviews
with the hostage taker or hostages provide information without having to engage in dangerous
tactics.
83. This is not true of many situations outside the limited area of Ongoing Criminal
Incidents. In the case of earthquakes, natural disasters, and other catastrophes, live news reports
are essential to the public safety and should not be subject to this type of restriction.
84. This assumes that law enforcement cooperates with the media and that the situation is
relatively short in duration. In instances where law enforcement does not provide the media with
information, or the incident drags on for weeks as did Waco, these factors would be considered
by the court and would likely make otherwise unreasonable conduct, reasonable.
85. Nola M. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 16 Cal. App. 4th 421, 426 (1993).
86. KEETON Er AL., supra note 67, § 31, at 169.
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judicial construction of the duty owed. In most cases, the media's duty
will be to refrain from any direct actions which could foreseeably lead to
the injury or death of a hostage or police officer. Thus, a breach analysis
will be closely tied to the reasonableness analysis conducted to determine
if a duty existed in the first place.87 Consequently, if the court finds that
the media's conduct was unreasonable, and thereby imposes a duty, a
breach will also be established. 88 On the other hand, if the court finds
that the media's actions were reasonable, it will not impose a duty, and a
breach analysis will be moot.
C. Causation
The next element that a plaintiff must establish to prevail in a
negligence action is causation. For causation to be satisfied, "there [must]
be some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the
defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered."8 9  Causation
consists of two elements: (1) the defendant's action must be the cause-in-
fact ("but-for cause") of the plaintiff's harm; and (2) the defendant's
conduct must be the legal cause ("proximate cause") of the plaintiff's
harm.9" To establish liability, the plaintiff must prove both elements.
1. Factual Causation
Factual causation is based on the idea that "[a]n act or an omission is
not regarded as a cause of an event if the particular event would have
occurred without it."91  Thus, the most common test for determining
factual causation is to determine if the injury would not have occurred but-
for the defendant's conduct. 92 For example, a fire caused by a child
playing with matches would not have occurred but-for the child's actions.
Conversely, a fire caused by an electrical short which took place while the
child was playing with matches would have occurred despite the child's
actions. Thus, in the second situation, the child is not the cause-in-fact of
87. See supra part III.A.
88. See, e.g., Weirum, 539 P.2d at 39 (where once a duty to refrain from conduct was
established, a breach of that duty was assumed by the court and, in fact, not even discussed).
89. KEETON ET AL., supra note 67, § 41, at 263.
90. Id. § 30 at 165 (The plaintiffmust prove "[a] reasonably close causal connection between
the conduct and the resulting injury. This is what is commonly known as 'legal cause,' or
'proximate cause,' and which includes the notion of cause in fact.").
91. Id. § 41 at 265.
92. Id
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the fire.93 Although cause-in-fact appears simple to determine, it becomes
difficult when the injuries complained of were caused by a third person.
In a hostage situation, there is always a potential for injury and a
likelihood of harm, despite the media's actions. Thus, separating the
media's actions from those of the hostage taker may prove problematic.
When the hostage taker's actions can be directly attributed to a particular
action of the media, cause-in-fact will likely be found. For example, in the
Hanafi incident discussed above,' if the terrorist leader had killed a
hostage in response to the reporter "rekindling" his rage, cause-in-fact
would be met. However, as media interference becomes less direct, the
likelihood of establishing cause-in-fact decreases. Thus, the incident in
Escondido that began this Comment would not likely establish cause-in-
fact, since there is no way to know whether the officer shooting the suspect
would have prevented the injury to the deputy.
2. Legal Causation
Assuming that a plaintiff can establish that the media's actions were
the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injury, the issue then becomes how far
liability will extend. This is proximate causation. Simply put, proximate
causation is "the limitation which the courts have placed upon the actor's
responsibility for the consequences of the actor's conduct."'  Courts
currently use two different tests for determining whether an act is the
proximate cause of an injury. First, the "foreseeability test" determines
whether the injury to the plaintiff was a foreseeable result of the defend-
ant's conduct.96  Second, the "direct consequences" test determines
whether the plaintiff's injury can directly be traced to the defendant's
conduct.97 This Comment will utilize the foreseeability test.
Under the foreseeability approach, the question is whether it was
foreseeable that the media's conduct during an Ongoing Criminal Incident
would lead to harm. As with cause-in-fact, foreseeability depends in part
on how direct the media's actions were. For example, if harm had resulted
from the media's actions during the Hanafi incident, these actions would
likely be seen as foreseeable. On the other hand, the reporters' actions
during the Escondido incident would likely be deemed unforeseeable.
93. As Keeton points out, "[tihe omission of crossing signals by an approaching train is of
no significance when an automobile driver runs into the sixty-eighth car." IdL
94. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
95. KEETON ET AL., supra note 67, § 41, at 264.
96. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
97. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1876).
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Between these two examples lies the limit of foreseeability. However,
since the variety of situations that might occur is almost unlimited, it is
sufficient to say that proximate causation, like cause-in-fact, is not a
complete bar to liability for the media. Since proximate causation under
either approach is determined by the jury, the determination of proximate
cause will likely depend on what the jury believes is "just." If the fact-
finder believes that society's interests are served by finding liability,
proximate causation will likely be found. Since juries are likely to be very
sympathetic to someone tormented and injured by a hostage taker or
someone who was injured trying to rescue a hostage, a jury may be willing
to stretch the boundaries of causation to allow recovery.
Further complicating proximate causation, however, are intervening
causes. "An intervening cause is one which comes into active operation in
producing the result after the negligence of the defendant," 98 severing the
chain of proximate causation and preventing the defendant from being held
liable. 9 There are three types of possible intervening causes during an
Ongoing Criminal Incident: (1) the hostage taker's criminal actions; (2) the
rescue efforts of law enforcement; and (3) the hostage's efforts to escape.
Generally, the criminal or tortious acts of another person are
intervening causes.1°° However, where such criminal or tortious acts are
foreseeable, they will not act as an intervening cause.' Again, often the
issue turns on what a jury believes is "just." If the jury believes that the
danger of the media's actions was foreseeable, the hostage taker's acts will
likely be found foreseeable. If one accepts the argument that hostage takers
are generally mentally unstable, it is likely that a variety of actions would
be foreseeable rather than intervening causes. Thus, the fact that a
plaintiff's harm was caused by the illegal acts of a hostage taker will likely
not prevent recovery.
A media defendant might also argue, however, that the rescue efforts
of law enforcement are an intervening cause. Generally, efforts to rescue
another person are not seen as intervening causes."° This is true not
only when the rescue effort is spontaneous, but also where there is time for
thought or planning.'0 3 Additionally, whether the person injured in the
98. KEErON ET AL., supra note 67, § 44, at 301 (emphasis in original).
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 440 (1965).
100. KEaTON ET AL., supra note 67, § 44, at 313.
101. Weirum, 539 P.2d at 40.
102. See Wagner v. International Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 438 (N.Y. 1921) ("The risk of
rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man.").
103. See, e.g., Parks v. Starks, 70 N.W.2d 805, 807 (Mich. 1955) (holding that a lapse of
nine hours from the original negligence was not sufficient to prevent liability to the tortfeasor for
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attempted rescue is the rescuer or the person being rescued, the original
wrongdoer is still liable." Thus, police actions in attempting to rescue
a hostage will not be seen as an intervening cause in either a suit by the
hostage or an officer.
Finally, actions taken by hostages, such as escape attempts, may also
be seen as intervening causes. However, like the rescue efforts discussed
above, actions taken by one who is fleeing danger are generally viewed as
foreseeable rather than intervening causes. 5 This is true whether the act
is instinctive or occurs after time for reflection; and whether the resulting
injury is to the person attempting to escape, or to another."° Thus, any
actions taken by a hostage to escape are unlikely to provide the media with
a defense to liability.
D. Damages
The final requirement for establishing a negligence cause of action is
damages. To recover, the plaintiff must establish that he or she suffered
some actual harm as a result of the defendant's negligence.' 7 "Nominal
damages, to vindicate a technical right, cannot be recovered in a negligence
action, where no actual loss has occurred. The threat of future harm, not
yet realized, is [also] not enough."' 8  Damages for emotional distress
may or may not be recoverable depending on the jurisdiction,"1 9 but if the
emotional distress is accompanied by physical injury, the probability of
recovery increases.10 In either case, the plaintiff must prove some actual
damage in order to prevail. Plaintiffs will have little difficulty establishing
damages if there is a real and cognizable injury. When direct interference
occurs and leads to physical injury, damages should be easy to establish
(e.g., a ,unshot wound or other physical injury that occurred immediately
after the actions of the media). Conversely, where only emotional harm
injuries incurred by a rescuer).
104. KEETON Er AL., supra note 67, § 44, at 307.
105. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Atlantic City R.R. Co., 49 A. 450, 451 (NJ. 1901) (plaintiffs
leaping from a moving vehicle to escape danger was not sufficient to eliminate defendant's
liability for negligence that created the danger).
106. KEETON Er AL., supra note 67, § 44, at 307.
107. Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 374 N.E.2d 582, 584 (Mass. 1978).
108. KEETON ET AL., supra note 67, § 30, at 165 (citations omitted).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965). Compare Rodrigues v. State, 472
P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970) (holding that damages for serious emotional distress may be recovered
without the presence of physical injury) and Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (Mass.
1982) (requiring an objective physical manifestation to recover emotional damages).
110. KEnTON ET AL., supra note 67, § 54, at 361.
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occurs, proving damages will be more problematic.' Since the types of
damages allowed vary by jurisdiction and are a question for the fact-finder,
establishing damages will depend upon the facts of each case. Unfortu-
nately, the vast number of potential injuries prohibits an exhaustive list of
conditions when recovery would be allowed. The important thing to note
is that some "real" injury must be proven. Thus, the more physical the
injury, the greater the likelihood of recovery.
Assuming that a plaintiff can establish all of the required elements, a
media defendant will still have a number of tort defenses against liability.
IV. TRADMONAL TORT DEFENSES
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of negligence, a
media defendant can raise a variety of tort defenses. The two most
plausible tort defenses to media negligence are: (1) assumption of risk; and
(2) comparative negligence." 2 This section will explore these two
defenses.
A. Assumption of Risk"
3
Where a plaintiff is aware that a risk exists and voluntarily encounters
it, he or she assumes the risk involved and liability will not be imposed
upon the defendant." 4  To establish an assumption of risk defense, the
defendant must prove two separate elements: (1) the plaintiff was aware
111. For a thorough discussion of emotional distress damages in the absence bf physical
injury, see Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:
Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTINGS L. 583 (1982).
112. Another negligence defense which would be viable for use in a media negligence action
would be contributory negligence. This provides that if a plaintiff's negligence is partially
responsible for their injury, they are barred from recovery. However, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky found that forty-one states had adopted a comparative negligence rather than
contributory negligence approach. Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713, 716 n.3-4 (Ky. 1984). Since
contributory negligence is no longer used in the majority of jurisdictions, this Comment will
analyze only comparative negligence.
113. There are actually two types of assumption of risk: express and implied. An express
assumption of risk generally occurs in employment situations where an employee signs a waiver
acknowledging his or her acceptance of the risks of their job. Implied assumption of risk occurs
when plaintiffs do not expressly consent to the danger, but their acceptance can be inferred from
their conduct. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287, 290 (Fla. 1977). Since a hostage situation
would not give rise to an express assumption of risk, implied assumption of risk will be the only
one discussed by this Comment.
114. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 291. See also, KETON ET AL., supra note 67, § 68, at 480-
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of the nature of the risk he or she confronted; and (2) he or she voluntarily
encountered that risk."5
For a hostage who is harmed by the actions of the media, it is
unlikely that he or she will be aware of the danger created by the media's
conduct. It is also unlikely that he or, she could understand the risk
involved. However, even if the first element of assumption of risk were
established, the fact that a hostage is an involuntary participant in the
situation eliminates the possibility that he or she could ever assume the risk
voluntarily. Consequently, in a suit brought by a hostage, assumption of
risk will not protect the media from liability.
On the other hand, in an action brought by a police officer, assump-
tion of risk may provide a defense. Unlike a hostage, a police officer may
know of the actions of the media and the risks created by them.
11 6
However, whether an officer who is ordered to rescue someone is
voluntarily assuming the risk involved is unclear. It is generally true that
a plaintiff does not assume a risk when they are left with no reasonable
alternative course." 7  An officer ordered to attempt a rescue is not
making this attempt voluntarily. He or she is under a direct order, and
arguably, a legal duty."8 Thus, under a traditional analysis, assumption
of risk is not likely to be a defense against potential liability.
Some jurisdictions however have "Fireman's Laws" or "Professional
Rescuer Rules."".9  In these jurisdictions, firefighters and police offi-
cers120 are presumed to be aware of the risks involved in their jobs and
115. Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 291.
116. For instance, a SWAT team member's awareness that the team movements are being
broadcast, or that the media is talking to the hostage taker, may be sufficient knowledge to
constitute awareness of the risk.
117. KEETON Er AL., supra note 67, § 68, at 490-91.
118. Although police generally have no duty to rescue any individual member of society,
once they have undertaken a rescue, a duty to do so "reasonably" may be imposed. Since closing
off the area, preventing others from attempting a rescue, and then failing to attempt a rescue
themselves might be seen as unreasonable, there is probably a duty to reasonably attempt a
rescue. See, e.g., Morris v. Musser, 478 A.2d 937, 939-40 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) (finding that
police may be held liable for failure to rescue if a special relationship exists between the
individual harmed and police).
119. See generally Neighbarger v. Irwin Ind., Inc., 882 P.2d 347 (Cal. 1994); Lenthall v.
Maxwell, 138 Cal. App. 3d 716 (1982); Winn v. Frasher, 777 P.2d 722 (Idaho 1989); Fox v.
Hawkins, 594 N.E.2d 493 (End. Ct. App. 1992); Griffiths v. Lovelette Transfer Co., Inc., 313
N.W.2d 602 (Minn. 1981). But see MINN. STAT. § 604.60 (1988) (legislatively abolishing
Fireman's Law); Christensen v. Murphy, 678 P.2d 1210, 1216-18 (Or. 1984) (Supreme Court of
Oregon refusing to impose Professional Rescuer Rule in Oregon).
120. See, e.g., City of Redlands v. Sorensen, 176 Cal. App. 3d 202,207 (1985) (holding that
"Fireman's Rule" in California applies to police officers as well as firefighters).
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to have voluntarily assumed those risks.' Thus, a police officer is
precluded from recovering for injuries caused by another person's
negligence in the majority of cases. The only exceptions to this rule are
risks which are seen as "extraordinary,"'" hidden from the officer,"
or created by the actions of parties who are not participants in the event
that gave rise to the officer's presence.'24
Media negligence during an Ongoing Criminal Incident might be seen
as independent of the risk that gave rise to the officer's presence. Although
the actions of a hostage taker may normally be encountered by police, these
actions, when brought on by the media's negligent conduct, might be
viewed as independent. If they are seen as independent, the Professional
Rescuer's Doctrine will not block recovery for the officer."as If not, an
officer will be barred from recovery. This would, of course, depend on the
jurisdiction involved and the judicial construction of the Professional
Rescuer's Rule. Either way, there is a possibility that a police officer
would be barred from recovery in a jurisdiction that has adopted a
Professional Rescuer's Rule.
B. Comparative Negligence 26
In addition to assumption of risk, a plaintiff's own negligence may
also limit recovery. If a plaintiff fails to use due care to prevent his or her
own injury, he or she is comparatively negligent. 27 Although considered
a defense to a negligence cause of action, comparative negligence is not a
121. See, e.g., Lenthall, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 719 (barring recovery for a police officer shot
by a suspect he was trying to subdue).
122. See, e.g., Chinigo v. Geismar Marine, Inc., 512 So. 2d 487 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
123. See, e.g., Griffiths, 313 N.W.2d at 605.
124. See, e.g., Shaw v. Plunkett, 135 Cal. App. 3d 756, 760 (1982) (refusing to apply the
California "Fireman's Rule" to an action brought by a police officer intentionally struck by a car
driven by a customer of the prostitute he was arresting).
125. See, e.g., Lipson v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 822, 829 (Cal. 1982) (finding the
Professional Rescuer's Rule "does not provide protection to a defendant who commits
independent acts of misconduct after the firefighters have arrived on the premises"). See also
Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc., 882 P.2d 347 (Cal. 1994).
126. It is important to note before discussing comparative negligence, that in many of the
jurisdictions that have adopted comparative negligence, implicit assumption of risk is no longer
a defense. See, e.g., Blackburn, 348 So. 2d at 292; Salinas v. Vierstra, 695 P.2d 369, 373 (Idaho
1985). In these jurisdictions, implicit assumption of risk is simply treated as comparative
negligence. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242 (Cal. 1975). It remains unclear
however, whether statutory assumptions of risk (e.g., Professional Rescuer Rules) will be treated
as comparative negligence or will remain a bar to a police officer's action for negligence.
127. KEETON ET AL., supra note 67, § 67, at 468-70.
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defense to the imposition of liability."r Rather, in the majority of
jurisdictions, the plaintiff's recovery is simply reduced by the percentage
that he or she is found to be at fault.
129
In establishing comparative negligence, a defendant is required to
prove that the plaintiff breached a duty of care owed to themself, and that
his or her breach constituted a partial cause of the damages that he or she
suffered. 3 ° A duty presumptively exists to act with due care to avoid
injury to oneself.' If a defendant can establish that the plaintiff partially
caused his or her own injury, a breach of the duty to oneself is automatic.
In proving causation, the defendant must establish both cause-in-fact and
proximate causation. 132  Like assumption of risk, the dangerous actions
of hostages (e.g., attempting escape) are generally not considered negligent.
Thus, they will not give rise to a comparative negligence defense. Police
officers are also unlikely to be found comparatively negligent unless their
rescue attempt significantly departs from the conduct of a reasonable
officer.133  In either case - hostage or police officer - whether compar-
ative negligence would partially offset the plaintiff's damages would
depend a great deal on the facts and circumstances of the case.
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A BAR TO LIABILITY
If a plaintiff can establish a negligence cause of action and survive
traditional tort defenses, a media defendant will certainly raise the First
Amendment as a bar to liability."r The First Amendment states that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom ... of the
128. Li, 532 P.2d at 1243.
129. See, e.g., Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d
1226 (Cal. 1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886
(IM. 1981); Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982); Hilen v. Hayes, 673 S.W.2d 713
(Ky. 1984); Kirby v. Larson, 256 N.W.2d 400 (Mich. 1977); Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d
11 (Mo. 1983); Scott v. Rizzo, 634 P.2d 1234 (N.M. 1981). But see Bradley v. Appalachian
Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979) (finding that if a plaintiff is found to be more than
fifty percent at fault, recovery is barred).
130. Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 720.
131. See, e.g., Bartlett v. MacRae, 635 P.2d 666,669 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (affirming jury
instruction which read in part, "[i]t is the continuing duty of all people to keep and maintain a
reasonable lookout for their own safety").
132. KEEMTON ET AL., supra note 67, § 67, at 474.
133. See, e.g., City of Winter Haven v. Allen, 541 So. 2d 128, 135 (Fla. Dist. CL App.
1989).
134. The media may also raise the First Amendment as a bar to the negligence action itself.
Although this would lead to the First Amendment issues being dealt with prior to the negligence
action, it would not substantially change the First Amendment analysis.
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press."'135 This prohibition against congressional infringement, made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, 136 "is not limited
to the... idea that freedom of the press means only freedom from restraint
prior to publication.' ' 37 Rather, it has been construed to include punish-
ment after publication as well. Although the majority of First Amendment
cases deal with criminal punishment after the expression, the Supreme
Court has held that "[w]hat a State may not constitutionally bring about by
means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of
libel."'138 This would also seem to hold true of media negligence liability.
The imposition of civil damages regulates speech the same way that
criminal punishment does. 39  Thus, a plaintiff will be required to
establish the constitutionality of imposing liability in order to recover
damages.
Since the media's activities at Ongoing Criminal Incidents consist of
both newsgathering and broadcasting, the First Amendment raises two
different questions: First, whether the imposition of liability for negligence
during newsgathering violates the First Amendment; and second, whether
the imposition of liability for negligence in broadcasting violates the First
Amendment.
A. First Amendment Protection of Newsgathering
Most of the dangerous conditions created by newsgathering are
created by conduct rather than by speech. Although the First Amendment
does not explicitly mention conduct, the First Amendment has been
construed to protect conduct that contains sufficient elements of communi-
cation.140 To determine whether conduct is protected, the Court has
generally asked whether "[a]n intent to convey a particularized message
was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would
be understood by those who viewed it."14' However, since newsgathering
is not intended to convey a message, but to obtain information, "[tihe First
Amendment has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from
torts or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering."' 42 Thus,
135. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
136. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
137. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 n.3 (1942).
138. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).
139. ML
140. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
141. IL (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
142. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971).
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imposition of civil and criminal liability for illegal wiretapping,143
disorderly conduct,' 44 trespass, 45 and invasion of privacy 46 during
newsgathering have all been held constitutional.
Some commentators have argued, however, that protection of
newsgathering is implicit in the First Amendment Free Press Clause.47
This position depends in part on dicta from the landmark case of Branzburg
v. Hayes.148 In Branzburg, the Court noted that "without some protection
for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated."149
Relying upon this language, commentators argue that some protection exists
for newsgathering activities. However, as the Branzburg Court noted, "the
First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the
press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of
general applicability."'"0 Moreover, an examination of the Court's
newsgathering jurisprudence shows that the Court has refused to recognize
protections for newsgathering beyond the rights of the public, despite the
dicta in Branzburg.15' As the Court noted in Zemel v. Rusk,15 2 "[t]he
143. See, e.g., Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corp., 351 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1977), appeal
dismissed, 435 U.S. 920 (1978) (holding that Florida statute that prohibited taping telephone
conversations without all parties' consent did not violate the First Amendment).
144. See, e.g., City of Oak Creek v. King, 436 N.W.2d 285 (Wis. 1989) (upholding the
disorderly conduct conviction of a press photographer who crossed a police line at an airplane
crash and holding that the rights of the media are the same as the general public).
145. See, e.g., Stahl v. State, 665 P.2d 839 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1069 (1984) (upholding the criminal trespass conviction of nine reporters covering an anti-nuclear
demonstration); Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (journalist's
conviction for entering private home at the invitation of humane investigator executing search
warrant not barred by the First Amendment). But see Magenis v. Fisher Broadcasting, Inc., 798
P.2d 1106 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (holding mere trespass was not enough to impose liability on
reporter).
146. See, e.g., Ross v. Midwest Communications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989) ("[The constitution bar[s] liability for the dissemination of true,
private information if no liability would exist under the common law tort.").
147. See, Tom A. Collins, The Press Clause Construed in Context: The Journalists' Right
of Access to Places, 52 Mo. L. REV. 751 (1987); Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access,
and the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 927 (1992); Karen S. Precella, Comment, Freedom
of the Press: Does the Media Have a Special Right of Access to Air Crash Sites?, 56 J. AIR L.
& CoM. 641 (1990).
148. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
149. Id. at 681.
150. Id. at 682.
151. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589,609 (1978) ("[t]he First
Amendment generally grants the press no right to information about a trial superior to that of the
general public"); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) (stating that newspersons have no
constitutional right of access to "prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded to the general
public").
152. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to
gather information." 153  The imposition of liability for torts committed
during newsgathering is nothing more than a law of general applicability
that clearly falls outside the scope of First Amendment protections.
Therefore, the First Amendment should not bar recovery for media
negligence during newsgathering.
B. First Amendment Protection of Broadcasting
Unlike newsgathering, news broadcasts are clearly "speech" within the
protections of the First Amendment. Thus, the first question is whether the
restriction is content-neutral or content-based. Content-neutral restrictions
limit communication without regard for the message conveyed. "[L]aws
that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the
ideas or views expressed are in most instances content-neutral."'1 4
Content-based restrictions, on the other hand, regulate speech based on the
message conveyed and are imposed "because of disapproval of the ideas
expressed." '  Since the imposition of liability for broadcasts during
Ongoing Criminal Incidents clearly depends on the content of the broadcast,
it will certainly be treated as a content-based restriction.
1 1
6
Content-based restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional. 5 7
Thus, to survive judicial scrutiny, the plaintiff must establish that either:
(1) the regulation falls under one of the classes of unprotected or "less
protected" speech previously defined by the Court; or (2) the regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn
to achieve that end. 5
153. Id. at 17.
154. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994).
155. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992).
156. Although it could be argued that the imposition of liability on the media is content-
neutral because it focuses solely on the "secondary effects" of the speech. Secondary effects, as
defined by Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), were effects on the local
community which were not caused by the speech itself, but rather by the impact large numbers
of obscene theaters had on the local community. In the case of media negligence, the issue turns
on what effect the "primary" impact of the speech, namely the hostage takers reaction, has. As
the Court noted in Boos v. Barry, "[t]he emotive impact of speech on its audience is not a
'secondary effect .... ' [When a restriction] regulates speech due to its potential primary impact,
... it must be considered content-based." 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (emphasis added).
157. R.A.V., 112 S. CL at 2542.
158. Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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1. Negligent Broadcasting as Unprotected or Less Protected Speech
The Supreme Court has defined several categories of speech that are
unprotected or less protected and may be regulated based'on their content
without violating the First Amendment. Each category of speech has its
own test to determine whether a content-based restriction is constitu-
tional.159 Among the categories defined as unprotected or less protected
speech are the following: Speech that incites others to unlawful conduct "
or presents a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil
that Congress has a right to prevent ("the clear and present danger
test");'61 speech that is obscene ("obscenity"); 62 speech that proposes
or concerns a commercial transaction ("commercial speech"); 163 group
defamation;"6 publication of purely private information ("invasion of
privacy"); 165 and libel. 166  Of these categories, only the clear and pres-
ent danger test may apply to the imposition of liability for broadcasts
during Ongoing Criminal Incidents. 167
The clear and present danger standard was first articulated by the
Supreme Court in Schenck v. United States.168 In Schenck, the Court held
that a content-based restriction of speech could be upheld when the words
"are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent."'169 From this, the Court has developed
159. Although each unprotected class of speech uses its own test, these tests are all based
upon strict scrutiny which requires that a regulation of speech be supported by a compelling
government interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See infra part V.B.2.
160. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942).
161. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) as modified by Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
162. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
163. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942).
164. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
165. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759-61 (1985); Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
166. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
167. Clearly, media negligence is not obscenity, libel, publication of purely private
information or group defamation. Although the broadcasting activities of the media are
commercial in that the media is a business, they would not qualify as commercial speech as they
do not propose a commercial transaction or deal primarily with the economic interests of the
speaker and listener.
168. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
169. Id. at 52.
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two distinctly different versions of the clear and present danger test. Since
it is unclear which of the two tests would be applied in evaluating media
negligence, both standards will be considered.
The first approach to the clear and present danger standard was
articulated by the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio.70 Although the Court
did not specifically refer to the clear and present danger standard, it held
that a state may not restrict speech that advocates using force or violating
the law unless the speech "is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."171  The
Brandenburg opinion essentially collapses the clear and present danger
standard into the incitement standard set out by Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire.72 The court has interpreted this "incitement" approach to
mean that "both specific intent and imminence with respect to a non-speech
evil are required in order to punish [or restrict] speech."' 73 Under this
formulation, the imposition of media liability would require proof that the
media intended to bring about the harm. Since it is unlikely that the media
would ever intend harm to occur, it is unlikely that the Brandenburg
formulation of the clear and present danger test would allow the imposition
of liability on the media. In fact, the majority of courts confronting the
issue of liability for broadcasts have used the incitement model as the
standard for imposing liability and have denied recovery. 74 As one
commentator noted, "[a]s a bar to liability for physical injury caused by
170. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
171. Id. at 447.
172. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In Chaplinsky, the Court held that "insulting or 'fighting' words
- those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace" could be constitutionally regulated. Id. at 572. The language of Brandenburg seems to
take this standard, combine it with the Schenck clear and present danger standard and add a
specific intent requirement.
173. Donald L. Beschle, An Absolutism That Works: Reviving the Original "Clear and
Present Danger" Test, 1983 S. ILL. U. L.J. 127, 145 (1983).
174. This position was adopted by the California Court of Appeal in Olivia N. v. Nat'l
Broadcasting Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982). In Olivia N.,
the court upheld the dismissal of a suit filed by a minor female for an "artificial rape" inflicted
on her by several other minors after they saw a similar act in a television movie. Il at 891.
Since an intent to cause such acts by broadcasting the movie could not be shown, the court found
the First Amendment was a bar to the action for negligence and upheld dismissal. Id. at 894.
See also Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
959 (1988); Watters v. TSR, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 819 (W.D. Ky. 1989), affd, 904 F.2d 378 (6th
Cir. 1990); Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979); McCollum
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1988); Yakubowicz v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989); and DeFilippo v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., Inc.,
446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982).
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speech, the incitement standard works well." 75  Unfortunately, as a
standard for media negligence, it does not.
The second interpretation of the clear and present danger test was
articulated by the Court in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia.
17 6
In Landmark, the Court held that "[p]roperly applied, the [clear and present
danger] test requires a court to make its own inquiry into the imminence
and magnitude of the danger ... and then to balance the character of the
evil, as well as its likelihood, against the need for free and unfettered
expression. ' 177 Additionally, the Court held that consideration should be
given to other less restrictive measures that would fulfill the state's
interests. 178 Applied to a negligence action, the Landmark version of the
clear and present danger test replaces the normal foreseeability test in
evaluating whether liability should be imposed.179  The effect of the
Landmark test is to provide a constitutional standard that "retain[s] the
incitement standard's focus on imminence without its emphasis on the
strength of the defendant's efforts to induce action."'80
In most cases, imposition of liability for media negligence during
Ongoing Criminal Incidents would survive the Landmark approach. Direct
interferences, as in the Hanafi or Berkeley incidents, 1 ' certainly pose a
clear and present danger to both hostages and police officers. 2 More-
over, since the evils sought to be prevented by the imposition of liability
are the infliction of personal injury and death, they are clearly evils that
Congress, or a state, has the power to prevent. On the other hand, indirect
interferences most likely do not create a clear and present danger under
Landmark. Although the potential injury remains the same, the foresee-
175. David A. Anderson, Tortious Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 71, 75 (1990).
176. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
177. Id. at 842-43.
178. Id. at 843.
179. Anderson, supra note 175, at 74-75.
180. Id, at 75. This approach was used by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Walt Disney
Prods., Inc. v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981). The plaintiff in Shannon was a minor who
was injured while trying to duplicate a sound effects trick he had seen on the Mickey Mouse Club
television show. The court, although not citing to Landmark, adopted a formulation of the
Schenck standard very similar to that articulated in Landmark. According to the court, "[t]he
substantive evil which the tort law seeks to redress is the infliction of personal injury." Id. at
582. Thus, liability could be imposed if the broadcast at issue posed a clear and present danger
of personal injury. Although the court found the defendant's broadcast did not rise to that level,
its adoption of this interpretation of the test represents the first and only time it has been used in
a media context.
181. See supra part II.
182. See supra part HI.A.
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ability of harm decreases drastically. Thus, the imminence prong of
Landmark would not be met.
However, even if the actions complained of are found to pose a clear
and present danger, the Landmark approach also requires consideration of
less restrictive measures that would equally serve the state's interests.
83
Imposing liability for media negligence during Ongoing Criminal Incidents
would serve the following state interests: (1) protecting the lives and safety
of hostages and police officers by deterring members of the media from
acting negligently; (2) compensating victims of media negligence for their
injuries; (3) providing a clear standard for the imposition of liability, which
prevents the "chilling" of protected speech; (4) promoting the peaceful
resolution of Ongoing Criminal Incidents and preventing harm to the
perpetrator; and (5) insuring that the public continues to be informed about
Ongoing Criminal Incidents. The crucial question is whether any
alternative means can further these interests without placing the same
restrictions on speech.
One alternative measure that a state could take would be to entirely
eliminate press access to Ongoing Criminal Incidents. Although this would
eliminate the problems created by the media, it would also completely
eliminate this type of speech and prevent the public from overseeing the
actions of law enforcement. Hence, this alternative does not adequately
serve the state's interests. A second alternative would be to eliminate
media liability entirely. Although this would be less restrictive of speech,
it would also give the media carte blanche during Ongoing Criminal
Incidents. This could encourage negligent conduct, increase the likelihood
of injury, significantly hinder the actions of police, and fail to compensate
those harmed by the media's negligence. Thus, this alternative would also
fail to serve the interests of the state. A final alternative would be to allow
media access only after the fact, or to provide a designated area near the
incident for the media to receive reports on the situation's progress.
Although the state's interests would be adequately served, a greater than
necessary burden would be imposed on speech. Since the imposition of
liability would hinder negligent speech, it is a less restrictive alternative
than "after the fact" access and would be considerably more protective of
speech. Consequently, "after the fact" access would not survive the
Landmark analysis. Considering the three alternatives above, the
imposition of negligence liability appears the least restrictive means to
183. Landmark Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 843.
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serve all of the state's interests. Thus, it is likely that the imposition of
media liability would survive a Landmark analysis.
Of course, if the trial court applies the Brandenburg version of the
clear and present danger test as opposed to the Landmark version, the
imposition of liability would constitute a restriction of protected speech.
If this occurs, the restriction will be judged by the ad hoe balancing
process.
2. Media Liability Under Ad Hoc Balancing
Content-based restrictions that do not fall into unprotected or low
value categories of speech are "presumptively invalid"' and the Court
subjects these regulations to "the most exacting scrutiny."'85  This
requires analysis of two separate issues: (1) whether there is a compelling
state interest served by the imposition of media liability; and (2) whether
the negligence standard adopted is both narrowly drawn and necessary to
achieve the state's interests.
18 6
As discussed above, the state has several interests in imposing liability
on the media. Many of these interests (e.g., safety of hostages and the
police, and compensation of victims) are compelling. The real issue,
however, is whether imposing liability on the media is necessary to further
these interests and is narrowly drawn to achieve them. Although the
Supreme Court has never clearly defined what narrow tailoring is, it has
defined what it is not. A restriction is not narrowly tailored when "'a
substantial portion of the burden [it places] on speech does not serve to
advance the [State's] content-neutral goals.""' 7  It is also clear that a
restriction is not narrowly tailored when a less restrictive alternative is
readily available.'88 Thus, "narrowly tailored" means that the regulation
at issue is the least restrictive alternative that is readily available and the
regulation restricts only speech that is contrary to the state's interests.
Under this definition, the necessity requirement collapses into the definition
of narrowly tailored. Realistically, if a less restrictive means of furthering
the state's interest is readily available, then the more restrictive standard is
not really necessary. Conversely, if the statute at issue is the least
restrictive means of achieving the state's interest, it is both necessary and
184. P.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
185. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
186. Perry Educ. Ass'n., 460 U.S. at 45.
187. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 122
(1991) n.* (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).
188. Boos, 485 U.S. at 329.
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narrowly tailored. In either case, the Court presumes that the imposition
of liability is invalid and the plaintiff has the burden to prove that it is not.
Consequently, there is little chance for a plaintiff to recover damages if ad
hoc balancing is applied.
Whichever First Amendment standard is applied by the court,
plaintiffs seeking to recover damages for media negligence during an
Ongoing Criminal Incident will find it difficult to prevail. Plaintiffs
seeking recovery for newsgathering activities must establish a negligence
cause of action that will survive tort defenses and then show that the
activity at issue is "conduct" which is unprotected by the First Amendment.
Despite this higher burden, plaintiffs asserting negligence liability arising
from newsgathering are much more likely to prevail than plaintiffs asserting
liability for broadcasting activities. Plaintiffs seeking recovery for
broadcasting activities will not only have to establish a negligence cause of
action and survive the assertion of tort defenses, but must also survive a
complete First Amendment analysis. Further complicating this subject is
the realization that media actions will not likely be composed of newsgath-
ering or broadcasting alone, but rather a combination of both newsgathering
and broadcasting activities. Thus, the court will likely apply the more
protective standard of broadcasting and deny recovery to the plaintiff.
Clearly, the current state of the law is confusing, and as such, it fails
to provide guidance which would allow the media to tailor their activities
to avoid liability. This uncertainty promotes self-censorship as the media
avoids otherwise permissible conduct to avoid liability. Moreover, as there
are a variety of standards that might apply, inconsistent results in the lower
courts are likely. Clearly, a new standard is needed for media negligence
during Ongoing Criminal Incidents.
VI. MEDIA NEGLIGENCE: A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
By adopting the clear and present danger test articulated in Landmark
and combining it with a modified negligence standard, a new standard can
be developed which will better serve society's interests. This section will
propose a new standard for use in media negligence actions that arise out
of Ongoing Criminal Incidents and explore its application and advantages
by applying it to several hypothetical situations.
A. The Standard: An "Unreasonable Risk"
Approach to Media Negligence
A more effective negligence standard for media activities during
Ongoing Criminal Incidents would be:
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A) When a member of the press, during an Ongoing Criminal
Incident (e.g., hostage situation, barricaded suspect, or terrorist
attack), knew or should have known that his or her broadcasting
or newsgathering activities created a clear and present danger of
harm to a hostage, or any person engaged in a rescue or
apprehension effort, he or she will be liable for the damages that
occur to such hostage or rescuer/apprehender, when:
1) a reasonably prudent person, in the press member's
position, would have foreseen the danger of his or her
broadcasting or newsgathering activities; and
2) those activities were the factual and legal cause of the
plaintiff's harm.
B) The tortious or illegal actions of a third party shall not be an
intervening cause when those actions were foreseeable conse-
quences of the press member's actions.
C) Damages available under this section are only for wrongful
death, personal injury, and emotional damages that result from
physical injury. No punitive, exemplary, or property damages
shall be available under this section.
D) Neither assumption of risk nor the Professional Rescuer's
Rule shall foreclose the recovery of any person engaged in a
rescue or apprehension effort under this section.
B. Applying the Standard
The following situations, both hypothetical and real, will explore how
and when liability would be imposed under the new standard, as well as
what types of media activities would give rise to liability."9
1. Situation #1 - Hypothetical
A terrorist takes over an elementary school principal's office and
takes several children hostage. As police set up to respond to
the incident, a local television station camera crew calls the
principal's office and arranges for a live interview with the
hostage taker. A camera crew is dispatched to the location and
interviews the terrorist live on the air, via cellular phone. The
reporter asks the terrorist whether he would really injure one of
189. Since the imposition of liability for purely newsgathering activities does not pose a
problem even under the current law, all of the situations used will involve either broadcasting
activity or a combination of both broadcasting and newsgathering activities.
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the children if his demands are not met. To prove his sincerity,
the terrorist shoots a child and throws him through a window so
that the camera crew can see him. The child, a quadriplegic,
now sues.
Under the unreasonable risk standard, this is a situation where liability
would be imposed. It is foreseeable that the actions of the reporter, both
in contacting the terrorist and in asking about his sincerity, would lead to
harm. Moreover, a reasonably prudent person, in a press member's
position, would not have acted in such a manner. Since the child's injury
was in direct response to the reporter's actions, both legal and proximate
causation would be met. Since the injury incurred by the child left him a
quadriplegic, he could recover for the physical injury, its ramifications (e.g.,
lost earnings, pain and suffering, etc.), and the emotional damages as well.
2. Situation #2 - The Lucasville Prison Riots
An inmate disturbance occurs at a local prison. The media
descends on the scene and begins to report the death threats
made by inmates. A prison spokesperson holds a press briefing
and in a radio interview states that the threats made by inmates
are just part of the normal negotiation process and that the
inmates have been making these types of threats all along. After
hearing the interview live on the radio, the inmates kill a prison
guard/hostage to show their sincerity.1" The plaintiff is the
dead guard's husband.
Despite its similarity to Situation #1, this situation would not give rise
to media liability. Although the media broadcast the information that led
to the guard's death, the negligent actions of a prison spokesperson would
not be regarded as foreseeable. Moreover, causation would also not be
established since the speech that caused the guard's death was uttered by
a prison official rather than by a reporter. Further, the publication of
official government statements to the press could never be seen as posing
a clear and present danger of causing harm, whatever the statement's
content.
190. Paul Barton, Experts Warn Media to Examine Their Role in Lucasville Riot, Gannett
News Service, Apr. 19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Papers File.
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3. Situation #3 - Hypothetical
Police and the media respond to a barricaded suspect at a liquor
store. The media begins live coverage of the standoff and
reports that the SWAT team is attempting to break into the back
door of the store. The suspect, who is watching the broadcast,
immediately begins firing through the door, hitting and seriously
injuring two SWAT team members in the process. The
plaintiffs are the injured officers.
In this situation, the officers could recover under the unreasonable risk
standard. It was foreseeable that the suspect would react violently to the
covert entry of police. Thus, the broadcast posed a clear and present
danger of harm to the officers since broadcasting the SWAT team's
location would compromise their covert entry. Since the actions of the
suspect are directly traceable to the timing of the broadcast, causation
would also be met. Most importantly, this situation illustrates why the
unreasonable risk standard provides an exception to the Professional
Rescuer Rule. Under the current state of the law, the plaintiff officers
would presumptively assume the danger of being shot by a suspect. Thus,
the officers would be barred from recovery. However, in this situation, the
officers certainly would not expect someone on the outside of the building
to provide the suspect with information about their plans. Thus, recovery
would be allowed under the unreasonable risk standard, despite the fact that
under the current law, the officers would not recover.
4. Situation #4 - Escondido
A barricaded suspect flees his condominium and runs down the
condominium's driveway, shooting at police with an assault
rifle. A SWAT team member leaps out of a vehicle in an
attempt to shoot the suspect before he reaches the end of the
driveway. The officer is forced to forego shooting the suspect
to avoid hitting a camera crew who is stationed across the street.
The suspect turns the comer and shoots a deputy sheriff,
seriously injuring him. The plaintiff is the injured deputy.
As in situation #2, this is not a situation where liability would be
imposed under the unreasonable risk standard. Although the media clearly
interfered and was, arguably, a causal link in the deputy's injury, the
consequences of the media's actions would have been almost impossible to
foresee. Thus, liability would not be imposed.
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C. The Advantages and Disadvantages of
the Unreasonable Risk Standard
The adoption of the unreasonable risk standard for media negligence
during Ongoing Criminal Incidents would provide four distinct advantages
over the current law. First, it would provide a clear standard for the media
to evaluate their activities and allow the media to make informed decisions
about what risks to undertake. This, in turn, would be more protective of
speech as the media would not be forced to "over-censor" their speech for
fear of liability. Additionally, the unreasonable risk standard would allow
for a uniform application of the law and eliminate the varying approaches
currently being used. Second, the adoption of this standard would deter
members of the media from engaging in dangerous reporting activities for
fear of incurring liability. Although this would lead to some self-
censorship, this is not necessarily bad. One of the purposes of tort law is
to deter conduct which puts others at risk. Media self-censorship would
stand to protect the interests of society as a whole and prevent harm to
others. Moreover, self-censorship already occurs under the current state of
the law where the media cannot discern which activities may give rise to
liability. Eliminating this form of self-censorship and replacing it with a
more beneficial approach can only stand to improve the position of the
media. Finally, adoption of the unreasonable risk standard would provide
compensation for the victims of media negligence, where little or none
currently exists. As discussed above, the current state of the law makes
recovery for media negligence unlikely. Adoption of the unreasonable risk
standard would eliminate this problem and enable these victims to receive
compensation for their injuries.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current state of the law offers little guidance for media negligence
actions. This creates a disincentive for responsible reporting and increases
the danger of harm resulting from the actions of the media. Adoption of
the unreasonable risk standard would eliminate most of these problems and
better serve the interests of both society and the media. By providing a
clear standard, the unreasonable risk approach would allow the media to
better tailor its actions to avoid liability, which in turn is more protective
of both hostages and police officers. Although there will certainly be a
limited amount of media self-censorship, such self-censorship is certainly
more desirable than encouraging negligent conduct. Protecting the tortious
acts of the media is certainly not the purpose of the First Amendment. As
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the California Supreme Court once noted, "[tihe First Amendment does not
sanction the infliction of physical injury merely because achieved by word,
rather than act.""'' Unfortunately, until the courts adopt a standard
similar to the unreasonable risk approach proposed by this Comment, the
First Amendment will not only continue to sanction harm, it may even
encourage it.
Jonathan B. Becker*
191. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 40 (Cal. 1975).
* This Comment is dedicated to the memories of Lonnie Brewer, Conway LeBleau, Robert
Williams, Todd McKeehan, and Steven Willis, who made the ultimate sacrifice for the sake of
our society - society lost more than you on December 5, 1987 in Escondido and February 28,
1993 near Waco, Texas. I owe a tremendous debt of thanks to Lt. Sid Heal, Capt. John Kolman,
Ofc. G.R. Cason, Sgt. Don Borinski, Stu Nakamura, Jack Killorin, Capt. Dave Heinig, Professor
Chris May, Lt. Joe Payne, "The Chief' Daryl F. Gates, and my dear friends at BATF & FBI,
whose names "I cannot seem to recall." Thanks are also due to Joe Tooley and Dirck Morgan
for the information they provided. I would also like to acknowledge the efforts of the following
people: Michele Goldsmith, who went out of her way to make this whole process easy, when it
could have been extremely difficult; Karen Rinehart and John Krings for working above and
beyond the call of duty; and Dave Miller, Tan Thinh, Thorn Leiken, Wendy Chang, and Steve
Ragona for their "reads" of my paper. Most of all, I owe everything to: Melissa Lynn Patterson
for her endless love, support and patience; Judy Becker for January 17 and for her love, support
and understanding over the years; and Bruno von Richtovan for just being "The Boone."
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